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THEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF  
THE UNITY OF MANKIND
Fr. Mikhail Zheltov
The idea of the genetic unity of all mankind is an integral part of Christian 
teaching. The purpose of this brief survey is to illustrate its role within the 
Greek patristic tradition, and then to point to a few examples from modern 
science which lend support to this ancient idea.
1. Biblical Thought
The idea of the unity of all mankind is expressed already in the Bible. 
It appears vividly, for example, in the story of the creation of Eve from 
Adam’s rib (Gen 2:18–24) and the following statement that Eve was “the 
mother of all living” (Gen 3:20). One also recalls how important for the 
Old Testament writers are genealogies tracing from Adam the descent of 
the nations of the earth (and similar genealogies also found their way into 
the New Testament, in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke).
In the New Testament the idea of the genetic unity of mankind acquires 
a crucial soteriological and Christological meaning:
As through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and 
so death passed unto all men, [for that] in him (eph’ hōi) all sinned1 . . . . For if, 
by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one; much more shall 
they that receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness 
reign in life through the one, even Jesus Christ. (Rom. 5:12, 17)
In patristic tradition this teaching of the apostle Paul was developed fur-
ther; for example, the sixty-ninth chapter of the “Second Oration against 
the Arians” of St. Athanasius of Alexandria is actually an expanded para-
phrase of these verses from the Epistle to the Romans.2
2. Patristic Developments
The idea of the universality and unity of the nature of mankind was ab-
solutely natural for the Church Fathers, not only because of its Biblical 
background but also because it could be taken as compatible either with 
Plato’s world of ideas or Aristotle’s thinking on first and second substanc-
1It should be noted that this famous verse can be translated differently—without “in him.”
2And note that it follows the sense of the translation of Rom 5:12 given in the main text, 
and not in note 1 (see PG. 26. 293).
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es. The Fathers of the fourth century readily affirm that all humans share 
one common nature, and that this nature can be compared with a real be-
ing of some sort. So, for example, St. Gregory of Nyssa writes:
Since, then, there was needed a lifting up from death for the whole of our 
nature, He [i.e., Christ] stretches forth a hand as it were to prostrate man, 
and stooping down to our dead corpse, He came so far within the grasp of 
death as to touch a state of deadness, and then in His own body to bestow on 
our nature the principle of the resurrection, raising as He did by His power 
along with Himself the whole man. For since from no other source than 
from the concrete lump of our nature had come that flesh, which was the 
receptacle of the Godhead and in the Resurrection was raised up together 
with that Godhead, therefore just in the same way as, in the instance of this 
body of ours, the operation of one of the organs of sense is felt at once by the 
whole system, as one with that member, so also the Resurrection principle of 
this Member, as though the whole nature [of mankind] were a single living 
being (kathaper henos ontos zōiou pasēs tēs physeōs), passes through the entire 
race, being imparted from the Member to the whole by virtue of the continu-
ity and oneness of the nature (kata to suneches te kai hēnomenon tēs phuseōs).3
For the Fathers of the fourth century, the theme of the universality of 
nature of all mankind was not a disputable matter. This may have been 
due in part to the spirit of the epoch, when—within the framework of 
Trinitarian controversies of the period—development of proofs of the con-
substantiality of the Divine hypostases was the main task for the most out-
standing theologians (although the notion of Divine consubstantiality is 
not identical to the idea we discuss here). The picture remained the same 
in the beginning of the fifth century, so that it was quite natural that St. 
Cyril of Alexandria in his exegesis returns to this theme again and again. 
For example, he writes:
We are in no way different in our nature from our offspring, nor are we sun-
dered from them in an alienation of nature, although we are distinguished 
by a difference of outward personality; in illustration of which, let any man 
who has looked upon the son begotten by himself consider the history of 
the blessed Abraham. But in the case of men the difference is often very 
considerable, each one tending definitely, in a way, towards a retirement 
and withdrawal of himself into a peculiar line of life and manners, without 
feeling personally bound up in the other; although their unity of essence is 
certain and evident to all. . . . For how can distinction exist in the unity (with 
reference to which each individual has some special characteristic)? For Pe-
ter is Peter, and not Paul, and Paul is not Peter; yet they remain without 
distinction in their nature. For both possess one kind of nature, and the indi-
viduals who are associated in a unity of nature have that same kind without 
any difference at all. . . . We believe that it was to secure the benefits for all 
the nature [of mankind], through Himself and in Himself first as in the first 
fruits of humanity, that the Only-begotten has become like us.4
3Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism 32.4 (PG. 45. 78–80).
4Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John IX.1 (PG. 74. 216, 237, 276).
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But after St. Cyril’s time, when theological discussion for long focused 
on the Christological debates, the universality of the nature of all mankind 
turned out to be problematic. The idea of universal natures in general, 
and of the unity of the nature of mankind in particular, was doubted most 
radically by John Philoponus, a sixth-century scholar and monophysite 
theologian. In his theological thought Philoponus began to use the term 
“particular nature” (merikē phusis) widely. Philoponus’s really existing 
“particular natures” were opposed to universal natures, which he took to 
be abstract. In other words, in Philoponus’s view one can speak of real ex-
istence only of concrete instances of this or that universal nature, whereas 
the latter is only a virtual generalization. This position had crucial conse-
quences for Christological and soteriological aspects of Christian teach-
ing—for example, it meant that in His incarnation Christ accepted only 
His own “particular nature,” not a common nature of all humankind.
The answer to John Philoponus was given by his contemporary, Leon-
tius of Byzantium. Leontius denied Philoponus’s “particular natures,” as-
serting the real existence of universal natures, and introduced in his late 
treatise named “Epilyseis” the idea of an “individual” (en tōi atomōi) nature 
as a collection of a universal nature plus individual features, both having 
real existence.5 There was also around this time (in the sixth or seventh cen-
tury) another famous Leontius, Leontius of Jerusalem, but his position on 
this question is disputed: while some authors6 call his position “nominalis-
tic,” others interpret it in a quite opposite way.7 St. Maximus the Confessor, 
the most important Byzantine theologian of the seventh century, seems to 
have believed in the real existence of universal natures; in any case, his 
teaching on the logoi of things created naturally has that implication.8
However that may be, in the eighth century St. John of Damascus, the 
author of the greatest summa of all Greek pre-iconoclastic Orthodox the-
ology, completely rejected Philoponus’s idea of “particular natures” and 
affirmed the reality of universal natures, including the real existence of 
5This is, at least, the interpretation of Richard Cross, “Individual Natures in the Chris-
tology of Leontius of Byzantium,” Journal of early Christian studies 10 (2002), pp. 245–265. 
It should be noted, however, that a Russian scholar, Basil Louriè, believes that Leontius 
actually did accept Philoponus’s concept of “particular natures”; see his Лурье, История 
византийской философии: формативный период (St. Petersburg, 2006), pp. 331–346. Yet Lou-
riè’s interpretation is based for the most part not on quotations from the sources and their 
analysis, but on a long series of hypotheses and syllogisms, and Louriè does not even bother 
to refute the arguments of Cross, only stating that Cross “does not even notice the compli-
cated system which Leontius of Byzantium has developed as a basis for his concept of a 
potential (noumenal) existence of particular natures” (ibid., pp. 524–525), giving no further 
explanation of this strong statement. Therefore, the interpretation of Cross, based on the 
source texts, seems more reliable.
6For example, R. Cross, “Individual Natures.”
7For example, B. Louriè, Лурье, История византийской философии, who writes that Le-
ontius of Jerusalem was directing his efforts to the “transformation of the notion of Leontius 
of Byzantium and Eutychius [of Constantinople] about the real existence of the ‘particular 
nature’ into a purely intellectual abstraction” (p. 520).
8See J.-C. Larchet , la divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris, 1996), 
pp. 365–374.
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a common nature of all mankind.9 (He did not thereby exclude the real-
ity of individual natures as well; here he probably followed Leonitus of 
Byzantium.)10 Thus he writes:
Nature is perceived either as [1] a matter of pure thought only (for it has no 
independent existence), or as [2] that what is common in all hypostases of 
the same species, being their bond of union, and is [then] spoken of as nature 
viewed in species, or it is [perceived] [3] in a single hypostasis completely, 
[but] with the addition of accidents, and is spoken of as nature viewed in an 
individual, remaining identical with nature viewed in species. Therefore, 
God the Word, becoming incarnate, did not assume [1] the nature that is 
regarded as an abstraction in pure thought (for such a thing would not have 
been incarnation, but only an imposture and a figment of incarnation), nor 
[2] the nature perceived in species (for He did not assume the hypostases 
of all [humans altogether]), but [3] the nature perceived in an individual, 
which is identical with that viewed in species (for He took on Himself the 
first-fruit of our compound [nature]—i. e., not a [nature] which first has an 
independent existence and which had already formed an individual when it 
was assumed by Him, but a [nature] which took its existence in his hyposta-
sis). For the hypostasis of God the Word in itself became the hypostasis for 
the flesh, and in this very sense “the Word became flesh,” clearly without 
any change, and likewise the flesh became Word without alteration, and 
God [became] man. . . . And so it is the same to say either “the nature of the 
Word” or “the nature in the individual.” For this signifies strictly and exclu-
sively neither the individual, that is, the hypostasis, nor the commonality of 
the hypostases, but the common nature which is perceived and discerned as 
viewed and presented in one of the hypostases.11
In the centuries to follow, the Orthodox East knew of no debates on the 
real existence of universal natures which could be compared with the me-
dieval controversy on universalia in the Latin West.
Thus, for an Orthodox theologian for whom the authority of the Church 
Fathers is indisputable, the real existence of universal natures is not a mat-
ter of negation or neglect. Yet what should be the interpretation of this in 
the modern philosophical and cultural context, where the names of Plato 
and Aristotle, although held in respect, are not authorities as obvious as 
they were for the Byzantine authors,12 and where the ontological systems 
of Antiquity are only a particular case of a wider spectrum of opinions? 
Perhaps one can get some help from the natural sciences here—especially 
9See his treatise “Concerning Heresy,” chap. 83, in B. Kotter, Die schriften des Johannes von 
Damaskos, vol. 4 (Berlin and New York, 1981), pp. 49–50.
10See Richard Cross, “Perichoresis, Deification and Christological Predication in John of 
Damascus,” Mediaeval studies 62 (2000), pp. 69–124.
11John of Damascus, an exact exposition of the orthodox Faith, chap. 55; Kotter, Die schrift-
en, vol. 4, pp. 131–132. The numbering is mine.
12One should note, though, that from the Byzantine point of view the universal natures of 
all things were by no means equivalent to the Platonic “Ideas.” The Platonic teaching on the 
“world of Ideas” is explicitly rejected and condemned in the Synodikon of Orthodoxy, read 
in Byzantine churches each year; see Jean Gouillard, Le Synodikon de l’Orthodoxie: Édition et 
commentaire (Paris, 1967: Travaux et mémoires 2), p. 59.
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since the physical aspect of the universality and unity of mankind is even 
less obvious than the spiritual one.
3. Scientific Aspects
The most important observation to make for our purposes is the fact that, 
from a biological point of view, the human body is a result of the fission of 
a unique cell, which, in its turn, is a product of the confluence of two par-
ents’ cells, a male and a female. Now, can one say that after the confluence 
these two cells have ceased to exist—or have they just been transformed 
into some new state? In any case, the organic life of a human body, which 
is in fact the lives of its cells, is an indissoluble continuation of the lives 
of the parents’ bodies, so that the physical (at least) part of human nature 
could be described indeed as a “single living being” (using the expression 
of St. Gregory of Nyssa), which springs from the bodies of the first people 
and is steadily growing in time and in space.
In the very heart of the process of cellular fission is a molecule of DNA. 
It is this very molecule (together with the RNA and, possibly, some other 
secondary mechanisms still unstudied) which is the data record responsi-
ble for the construction and growth of the human body as a whole. It is this 
data, in the end, which makes the cells to function, split, and grow, using 
the atoms and molecules which have been already discussed earlier. Like 
the cells themselves, their DNA represents an indissoluble continuation of 
the process of their replication, which began with the first people; and the 
DNA molecules of all mankind are still compatible with each other. (Com-
patibility means here that theoretically any pair of a man and woman in 
good health, despite individual differences, could give birth to a common 
child.) Therefore, the information contained in DNA and other cellular 
mechanisms provides an informational field which is responsible for the 
existence of the bodily part of human nature as a whole, and, one could 
say, is a bridge between its purely material and informational unity.
Finally, one should also recall the achievements of analytical psychol-
ogy, with its “archetypes” of the “collective unconscious,” which could be 
used to promote the idea of informational unity of mankind further.
Of course, the listed examples have very little to do with ancient Greek 
philosophy and, therefore, do not ‘prove’ those patristic lines of thought 
which were based on its apparatus. Yet they could serve as an attempt to 
show to a contemporary audience that the ancient Christian thought on 
this matter is by no means outdated or ridiculous.
However that may be, a real religious experience of communion and 
unity of people with each other and with Christ can be gained in the 
Church—above all, during a Eucharistic celebration. That is what Apostle 
Paul meant in writing:
For we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. (Eph 5:30)
st. Tikhon’s orthodox University
